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Lithium ion battery fire hazard has been well-documented in a variety of 
applications. Recently, battery train technology has been introduced as a 
clean energy concept for railway. In the case of heavy locomotives such 
as trains, the massive collection of battery stacks required to meet energy 
demands may pose a significant hazard. The objective of this paper is 
to review the risk evaluation processes for train fires and investigate the 
propagation of lithium ion battery fire to a neighboring steel warehouse 
structure at a rail repair shop through a case study. The methodology of the 
analyses conducted include a Monte Carlo-based dynamic modeling of fire 
propagation potentials, an expert-based fire impact analysis, and a finite 
element (FE) nonlinear fire analysis on the structural frame. The case study 
is presented as a demonstration of a holistic fire risk analysis for the lithium 
ion battery fire and results indicate that significant battery fire mitigations 
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1. Introduction
With high energy density, lithium ion battery is quickly 
becoming the dominant rechargeable battery chemistry for 
electrified vehicles, which typically involves packaging 
lithium ion batteries in bulks. Studies on lithium ion bat-
tery fire are limited and design guidelines to prevent fire 
damage due to lithium ion battery fire are almost non-ex-
istent. Thermal runaway is one of the failure modes in 
batteries. It occurs when an exothermic reaction goes out 
of control, that is the reaction rate increases due to a tem-
perature increase causing further increases in temperature 
and hence a further increase in the reaction rate, possibly 
resulting in an explosion. For the lithium ion battery runa-
way, it is caused by the exothermic reactions between the 
electrolyte, anode, and cathode – with the temperature and 
pressure increasing in the battery, the battery will rupture 
at last [1-2]. For bulk storage of lithium-ion batteries, the 
fire propagation can be initiated by battery pack deformation 
[3]. Hence, the packaging design of a battery pack plays an 
important role in preventing cell fire propagation [4].
The battery train concept was initially introduced as a 
clean energy technology which involves a train configura-
tion that consists of two locomotives, one with a standard 
diesel-electric engine and another with a battery storage 
system – known as a zero-emission boost locomotive 
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(ZEBL) [5]. Currently, battery train technology is rapidly 
being promoted in the US, Germany, China, South Ko-
rea and Japan. Implementation of this technology could 
reduce diesel engine use by approximately 40% during 
train operation which results in an equivalent drop in air 
pollution from the locomotive. Similar to energy storage 
solutions, conventional design of a battery train involves 
the stacking of multiple lithium ion battery packs. Hence, 
the fire scenario should include fire safety stacking design 
of the battery packs within the locomotive.
In 2017, a rail cargo car carrying lithium ion batteries 
caught fire and exploded in downtown Houston [6]. The 
incident damaged several residential structures due to the 
shock waves and burned down a nearby warehouse. This 
incident indicated the potential danger for the ZEBL loco-
motive or other lithium-ion battery electrified trains. The 
intent of this study is to determine the fire propagation 
scenario for a lithium-ion battery train assuming the rail 
car is completely loaded with lithium ion batteries.
The motivation behind this study is a research of the 
potential of Wireless Power Transfer (WPT) technology 
for an electrified train using lithium-ion battery racks as 
the propulsion method. Trains are typically electrified by 
overhead catenaries or by stand-alone diesel-electric pow-
ered engines. Overhead catenaries are often expensive to 
construct, and diesel-electric locomotives have inherent 
pollution problems. Lithium-ion powered trains have the 
same benefits as typical electrified vehicles that include 
zero emission problems. Similarly, lithium-ion powered 
locomotives need to be charged.
WPT is an emerging technology that is designed to 
transfer power from a transmitter on the primary side of a 
receiver or multiple receivers on the secondary side, wire-
lessly. The WPT technology requires an Inductive Power 
Transfer (IPT) to be applied in the battery charging appli-
cation through the magnetic coupling to deliver the power. 
In the railway system, the conventional diesel-fueled lo-
comotives produce severe air pollution, which makes the 
electric locomotive more popular in the industry [7]. The 
WPT concept under current consideration will include 
large scale use of Li-ion batteries and it is important to un-
derstand the potential fire hazard that these batteries may 
introduce to a rail system in order to properly develop an 
appropriate fire protection and mitigation strategy.
However, the current procedure of charging an electric 
locomotive is too complex because it involves the railroad 
locomotive parking adjacent to a trackside power station, 
then having a railroad worker physically attach large 
electrical cables by hand to the locomotive. The new IPT 
charging technology has huge potential for improving the 
railway industry by means of saving the charging time, 
increasing the worker safety, reducing the cost as well as 
increasing the robustness of the charging system.
This paper investigates the fire safety of a neighboring 
structure due to fire propagation from a battery train. A lit-
erature review was first conducted to identify the literature 
that can best help structure a systematic study on the risks 
for a structure due to fire propagation from a battery train. 
A battery train fire propagation risk analysis is then per-
formed using dynamic modeling technique. Finally, a case 
study on a steel structure is presented to demonstrate the 
risk evaluation from a battery train fire. An expert opinion 
approach is used in rationalizing the fire risks. The fire 
propagation risk on the steel structure is presented in a 
risk index matrix.
Fire Safety Regulations for Rail-Road Struc-
tures Review
Initial sources on train fire investigation can be found 
in several publications from the APTA (American Public 
Transportation Association). The APTA Recommended 
Practice for Transit Bus Fire/Thermal Incident Investiga-
tion [8] is the recommended practice for fire safety analysis 
of existing passenger rail equipment. Every effective sys-
tem safety program has four essential elements:
(1) A means to identify and prioritize safety risk (a haz-
ard analysis);
(2) An action plan that allocates resources to reduce the 
most severe risks;
(3) A means to monitor, measure, and document the ef-
fectiveness of the action plan;
(4) Assesses periodic adjustment of the action plan 
based on the measured effectiveness and as service or 
equipment characteristics change. 
APTA outlines steps required for a thorough fire safety 
analysis. These steps have been summarized in Figure 1 
and organized with respect to historical data, site survey 
of the location, risk assessment of the possible fire scenar-
ios, and remediation plan for the assessment. Other rele-
vant APTA guidelines including recommended practices 
for fire safety [9], for fire protection systems [10], fire safety 
analysis for existing passenger rail equipment [11] and fire 
detection technologies [12], should also be evaluated for the 
fire safety concerns for Li-ion battery trains.
Figure 1. Fire Analysis Overview
https://doi.org/10.30564/jaeser.v4i3.3327
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The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) also 
has specific standards for fire protection – the NFPA (Na-
tional Fire Protection Association) 130 [13] is the standard 
for fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems (both 
surface and underground systems). The main objective of 
NFPA 130 is to ensure occupant safety and structural in-
tegrity against runaway fires. NFPA represents a minimum 
requirement to provide a reasonable degree of safety from 
fire and its related hazards in fixed guideway transit and 
passenger rail systems. Life safety and fire protection re-
quirements are specified for stations, trainways, emergen-
cy ventilation systems, vehicles, emergency procedures, 
communications, and control systems. 
NFPA 130 [13] states that systems shall be designed, 
constructed, and maintained to protect occupants who are 
not intimate with the initial fire development for the time 
needed to evacuate or relocate them or to protect such 
occupants in place during a fire or fire-related emergency. 
The structural integrity of stations, train-ways, and vehi-
cles is important to be maintained for the time needed to 
evacuate, relocate, or protect people who are not aware 
of the fire. NFPA 130 also states that there needs to be 
assumed possible fire scenarios that need to investigate 
while considering the location and size of a fire or a 
fire-related emergency. 
Finally, the International Building Code (IBC) [14] de-
fines required fire resistance ratings for buildings based 
on construction type and building element. IBC also pre-
sents several methods for establishing the fire resistance 
of components and assemblies to ensure that the required 
ratings are met including experimental fire testing as per 
ASTM E119 [15], prescriptive code adherence, or engineer-
ing calculation.
To develop a fire protection strategy, a fire risk anal-
ysis should be first conducted. The outcomes of the risk 
analysis should be a quantitative measure of the risk level 
and the potential spread scenarios that enables a perfor-
mance-based fire protection design to minimize the risks. 
To assess the risk level, a risk index can be established to 
quantify the fire risk. For example, Salvati et al. [16] used a 
fire risk indexing method to study forest fire risks.
In the current study, a risk indexing matrix is estab-
lished based on two perspectives, probability and severity. 
An analysis is conducted using a combination of how 
likely an event is to happen and how severe it would be if 
it did, to create a risk rating for the particular event. The 
probability aspect is scaled from 1 to 5, 1 being frequent 
and 5 being improbable to occur. The severity aspect is 
scaled 1 to 4 where 1 being catastrophic and 4 negligible. 
In this paper, we described the use of the risk indexing 
method for the evaluation of a steel warehouse structure 
for potential battery train fire. The risk indexing method 
helped in prioritizing the fire risks for the building, which 
helps in dictating the structural evaluation procedure for 
the building. The results of structural fire analysis using 
finite element method (FEM) are then conducted and used 
to establish the fire protection strategy.
Rail Car Battery Stack Fire Monte Carlo 
Simulation 
To determine how battery train fire propagates towards 
a neighboring structure, a Monte Carlo simulation is first 
conducted to determine the severity and likelihood of bat-
tery fire propagation. 
The risk simulation is established by performing a 
limited Monte Carlo-based dynamic modeling of the fire 
propagation. The dynamic modeling, originated from cel-
lular automaton [17], simulates the discrete state, space and 
time for fire propagation where each cell unit is assumed 
to be identical in properties and fire processes.
In the current study, the battery train fire propagation 
model is a two-dimensional battery stack represented by 
a 50 X 10 rectangular grid. The battery stacks are closely 
spaced, and fire is assumed to start from a single battery 
and propagate randomly (with an assigned probability of 
spreading) from the single cell to the neighboring cells. 
The transition at each time step is dependent on the state 
for the cell and the neighboring cell. Figure 2 shows the 
relationship between each cell and its neighbors. The cells 
are labelled by its index (i, j). Each cell is also identified 
by its state and is influenced by the state of its neighboring 
cells – the propagation of fire is determined at each time 
step by checking the states of neighboring cells [18]. The 
diagonal neighboring cells have no impact to the cell of 
interest. Also, at the boundary of the battery stack, empty 
cells are assumed. Hence, the actual matrix in calculation 
is (n+2, n+2).
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In the simulation for the spread of fire, a cell can con-
tain one of three values: 0 to indicate an empty cell with 
no battery or a burnt battery, 1 to indicate a cell with a 
non-burning battery, or 2 to indicate a cell with a burning 
battery. All batteries are initialized as not burnt nor burn-
ing. But once the cell is on fire, it is identified as burning. 
A battery always burnt down in one-time step. Hence, the 
cell is identified as empty during the next time step.
During each iteration (time step), the cell (i, j) is 
checked against its neighboring cells and its state is up-
dated by determining if the neighboring cell is on fire. If 
a cell’s neighbor cell is burning, the cell may or may not 
catch on fire, the assigned probability determines if the 
cell will catch on fire. The boundary of burnt cells is sim-
ilar to a fire break and no fire propagation will occur to 
such a boundary. This insulating boundary helps to dictate 
the direction of fire propagation based on the stochastic 
process. To propagate fire, a number (between 0.0 and 1.0) 
is randomly generated and compared to the assigned prob-
ability value. If the number if greater than the assigned 
probability value, then fire will start at the cell, or else, 
fire will not start. Furthermore, a burnt cell will not cause 
the neighboring cells to burn.






Time in the simulation does not represent any real 
time unit and is defined by the number of computing time 
steps. This is also due to the fact the actual fire chemis-
try is not considered in the model. At each discrete time 
step, the simulation determines the state of each cell at 
the next time step based on the state of each cell at the 
current time. Thus, by counting time steps, the simulation 
was able to generate a new grid for the next time step. 
The goal of the dynamic modeling simulation is to gain 
insight into the likelihood of fire spread and the speed of 
fire spread (in relative time). The model also allows visu-
alization of the fire propagation through animation of the 
simulated fire event.
By assigning the probability of fire propagation (from 0 
to 1), the analysis can generate the burning time and per-
centage of battery racks burned. The probabilistic analysis 
is not based on actual fire physics but estimates the proba-
bility of directional propagation from a random fire starter 
in a 2-D dense battery rack. The battery burning time for 
each cell is constant, but the propagation rate is dependent 
on propagation path and the remaining unburned batteries. 
1,000 randomly generated simulations were performed 
and the results are shown as the probability of propagation 
and the normalized duration and percentage of the battery 
burnt in Figures 3 and 4. Each figure presents the average 
of the data collected, as well as the range of all the data 
points recorded (limits of range shown with black circles). 
As shown in Figure 3, the percentage of the battery being 
burned reaches almost a constant 100 percent at a proba-
bility of 0.6 of a single cell fire propagation. On the other 
hand, the single cell fire will not reach the entire bulk 
if the probability of propagation is equal to or less than 
0.4. In Figure 4, the time step takes for the battery being 
burned varies significantly, meaning that the percentage 
of the battery being burned should be directly correlated 
to the possible fire scenarios. In general, it would take 40 
timesteps to burn the entire stack. 
Figure 3. Probability vs Percentage of Battery Burned
Figure 4. Probability vs Time Step of Battery Burned
The simulation process is known as a Monte Carlo 
simulation and it is conducted to determine the probabil-
istic distribution of the fire propagation scenarios. The 
results give a first-order indication of the likelihood of a 
fire propagation in the battery stack. Once the likelihood 
of fire propagation and the time of propagation are estab-
lished, then the fire scenarios at the selected site should be 
identified and more detailed fire risk evaluation should be 
performed. 
For the battery train fire study, the latter processes are illus-
trated using an actual warehouse and is presented as follows:
Case Study: North Carolina Capital Railyard 
Warehouse
To demonstrate the fire propagation risk analysis, a 
https://doi.org/10.30564/jaeser.v4i3.3327
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study has been performed on the North Carolina De-
partment of Transportation (NCDOT) Capital Yard train 
maintenance warehouse. The study evaluates the building 
structure for fire using finite element modeling and a fire 
risk analysis using an expert opinion approach to establish 
the risk indices for different fire scenarios, so that the crit-
ical aspects of the building fire can be unpacked for better 
understanding. 
Building Description
The 483 m2 building is an open-span steel structure. 
The eave height of the warehouse is 7.3 m and the roof 
is at 9.3 m from the floor slab. Figure 5 shows the steel 
structure that sits within the NCDOT Capital Yard. The 
bay width for the floor plan is 7.3 m by 7.9 m. Figure 6 
shows the plan view of the train warehouse. The building 
is composed of six rigid frames connected with beams 
and purlins on each roof side between the rigid frames 
[19-21]. The rigid frame is composed of tapered beams of 
W18x40’s [22-23]. The purlins are made of C10x25 beams. 
Figure 5. The NCDOT Capital Yard Maintenance Ware-
house
Since the case study is on an existing structure, to de-
termine the exact design of the structure, original shop 
drawings were retrieved from NCDOT. In addition, a la-
ser scan was performed onsite to generate 3D pointcloud 
imageries of the steel structure and the surrounding envi-
ronment [21]. Figure 6 shows the scanned structures and its 
surroundings. The 3D imagery allows for precision meas-
urements of the member dimensions and track locations 
to establish likely closest distance of any battery train 
may be approaching the structure. All the dimensions and 
measurements of structural elements in this study were 
validated using the LiDAR scan results.
a) LiDAR Scan of Warehouse Exterior
b) LiDAR Scan of Warehouse Interior
Figure 6. LiDAR Scans of the NCDOT Capital Yard 
Maintenance Warehouse: a) LiDAR Scan of Warehouse 
Exterior and b) LiDAR Scan of Warehouse Interior
2. Fire Risk Analysis
The purpose for adding fire protection to a structure is 
to prevent the building from collapsing during the event 
of a fire, controlling damage, and allowing for safe evac-
uation. This needs to be performed along with a detailed 
fire risk evaluation. The warehouse that is being analyzed 
in this case study contains fuel, oxygen, and heat source, 
which are three elements needed in order to ignite a fire. 
Fire behavior is dependent on the fire temperature, the 
heat transferred to the surface of the structure, and corre-
sponding rise of temperature occurring within the struc-
ture. Because the warehouse has open space and possible 
workers within, fire safety will be provided by selecting a 
way to control and extinguish the fire at an early stage and 
allow time for people to exit.
To analyze the fire risk, an expert opinion-based ap-
proach that involved multiple participants is performed. 
The following section describes the compartmentation of 
the warehouse and the different fire scenarios considered.
Warehouse Building Compartment Designa-
tion and Fire Scenarios
The warehouse building was partitioned in exterior and 
interior compartments, which have been assigned a nu-
meric number as illustrated in Figure 7 and summarized in 
Table 1. Some of the compartments have different condi-
tions for consideration: at compartment 9, there is a stand-
alone office with glass frames, a railroad track extended 
all the way into compartments 11 and 12 for sheltered 
repair works, and electric controls have been installed on 
the interior wall of compartment 10. Furthermore, chem-
icals were stalled closely to the structure in tanks next to 
compartments 13 and 14. These special considerations 
make the compartments behave differently during fire.
https://doi.org/10.30564/jaeser.v4i3.3327
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Figure 7. Warehouse Building Compartment Designation





1 Top left exterior wall
2 Top right exterior wall
3 Middle left exterior wall
4 Middle right exterior wall
5 Bottom left exterior wall
6 Bottom right exterior wall
Interior
7 Top left interior structural elements
8 Middle top left interior structural elements
9 Middle top right interior structural elements
10 Top right interior structural elements
11 Bottom left interior structural elements
12 Middle bottom left interior structural elements
13 Middle bottom right interior structural elements
14 Bottom right interior structural element
Another consideration in fire risk analysis is where and 
how ignition occurs. Even though this study focused on 
the battery train fire, other critical elements that may in-
duce fire to the building have also been considered. These 
include fire induced by electric power transformers, chem-
ical tanks outside of compartment 13 and 14, and a large 
gas tank behind the building. Thus, for this investigation, 
a total of six specific fire scenarios were considered and 
used for the fire risk analysis of the warehouse. These 
scenarios were chosen due to their high probability of 
occurrence. The six chosen scenarios are shown in Figure 
8. Each scenario is further identified by a numeric number 
and the detailed description for each scenario is shown in 
Figure 9.
Risk Index Matrix
The fire risk matrix shown in Table 2 is recommended 
for use by the APTA when conducting fire risk analysis 
and was the basis of the risk analysis described in this pa-
per. Each of the six fire scenarios was individually applied 
to each compartment of the warehouse, giving a total of 
84 scenarios. The expert opinion approach involved seven 
expert members with backgrounds in fire protection engi-
neering, structural engineering, and railway engineering. 
Each participant ranked the risks independently, and then 
the average risks from the collected opinions of the seven 
participants were calculated. The calculated averages are 
then used to rank the different scenarios. The most and 
least critical areas of the warehouse were then identified. 
The outcomes are then mapped onto the compartment 
schematic shown in Figure 10. A grey scale is used to sig-
nify the criticality of each scenario.
Figure 8. Warehouse with Scenarios
Figure 9. Details of Six Fire Scenarios for the Warehouse
Figure 10. Risk Index Schematic
https://doi.org/10.30564/jaeser.v4i3.3327
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Table 2. Risk Index Matrix [12]
The actual risk indices values are presented in Figure 
11, where the lower index values mean higher potential 
fire risks. As shown in Figure 11, the most significant fire 
scenario is fire propagating due to battery train parked in-
side of the structure and train fire propagating to compart-
ments 11 and 12. Hence, the structural evaluation will be 
focused on these two compartments.
Figure 11. Critical Fire Scenario Risk Index
Structural Fire Analysis
To understand the impact of fire on the warehouse 
structure, detailed structural analysis using finite element 
(FE) analysis was performed: Abaqus Finite Element 
Software [24] was used to develop a structural analysis 
model simulating one bay of the warehouse building un-
der fire loading. Figure 12 shows the actual dimensions 
of the structure (top view). Figure 13 shows the overall 
geometry of the single-bay model with given dimensions. 
2-noded cubic beam elements (B33) were used throughout 
the model, with tapered cross-sections defined on the col-
umns and fixed support boundary conditions. The frame 
was subject to self-weight through a gravity dead load and 
superimposed dead load, which were then held constant as 
fire loading was directly specified through a temperature 
field [25]. General static steps with automatic incremen-
tation and nonlinear geometry were used for the gravity 
load, superimposed dead load, and the application of the 
temperature field.
Temperature dependent, nonlinear material properties 
for the steel are shown in Figure 14 based on Eurocode 
[26] and input in to Abaqus through *Elastic and *Plastic 
parameters. Temperature dependent coefficient of thermal 
expansion is shown in Figure 15 based on the thermal 
strain defined in Eurocode [27]. Density was specified as a 
constant 7,850 kg/m3. 
Figure 12. Plan View; Train Warehouse
Figure 13. The Overall FE Model Geometry
Figure 14. Temperature Dependent Stress-Strain Curves 
for Steel
Figure 15. Thermal Characteristics of Fire Used in FE 
Modeling (a) Temperature Dependent Thermal Expansion 
and (b) Fire Curves
https://doi.org/10.30564/jaeser.v4i3.3327
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Fire temperature histories were input as predefined 
fields, applied directly to the frame members. A heat 
transfer analysis was not performed as it was assumed that 
the temperature of the unprotected steel members during 
an intense fire would closely follow the temperature of the 
fire. The hydrocarbon fire was chosen as the best approx-
imation of design fire in the absence of specific guidance for 
a large-scale lithium-ion battery fire. The Eurocode hydro-
carbon fire is shown in Figure 15 along with the ASTM E119 
[15] standard fire for comparison. Additionally, a modified Eu-
rocode hydrocarbon curve is included for study wherein the 
hydrocarbon fire curve was scaled to limit the temperature of 
the steel members to 538oC – the temperature threshold for 
steel columns based on ASTM E119. This curve corresponds 
to a scenario where the steel frame is assumed to be retrofit-
ted with appropriate fire protection.
3. Discussion
The final critical fire scenario resulted in the following 
risk index schematic shown in Figure 11. The critical fire 
scenario of the warehouse sourced from scenario two, 
which is the inside fire ignition scenario. This was the 
most significant scenario, as it had the lowest risk index 
values per compartment of the warehouse being analyzed. 
Because of the potential severity, this scenario was chosen 
to be analyzed in the Abaqus model. Scenario one (external 
adjacent fire) is also presented for comparison.
The following cases were modelled in Abaqus. Case 1 
models a full hydrocarbon fire on the entire frame based on a 
Scenario two interior fire. Case 2 models a hydrocarbon fire 
with protection on the entire frame, again exposed to interior 
fire. Case 3 models a full hydrocarbon fire on only half of the 
frame, representative of a Scenario three exterior fire.
The results of the modeled frame with the different 
fire cases are shown in Figures 17, 18, and 19, with cor-
respondence to Figure 16. Case 1 resulted in a maximum 
vertical displacement at the middle of the frame of 0.11 
m at 5 minutes. There was a maximum horizontal dis-
placement at the left upper node of 0.151 m at 13 minutes. 
There was a maximum stress of 27 MPa at 2 minutes and 
then decreases to 9.6 MPa for 3 more minutes. By approx-
imately 5 minutes into the fire, the stresses in the steel 
reached the reduced yield strength of the material at that 
given time and corresponding temperature of the steel, in-
dicating the onset of plastic behavior.
Figure 16. Cases Modeled in Abaqus
Figure 17. Case 1 Results
Figure 18. Case 2 Results
Figure 19. Case 3 Results
Case 2 resulted in a maximum vertical displacement 
of 0.085 m at 20 minutes. There was a maximum hori-
zontal displacement 0.037 m at 34 minutes. There was a 
maximum stress of 58 MPa at 10 minutes and reduces to 
43 MPa at 48 minutes. The stresses in the steel members 
were significantly below the yield stress during the dura-
tion of the fire. 
The last case resulted in a maximum vertical displace-
ment at the middle node of 0.041 m at 1.2 minutes. There 
was a maximum horizontal displacement at the upper 
left node of 0.15 m at 60 minutes. The stress was at its 
maximum at 0.5 minutes resulting in 29 MPa. At approx-
imately 3 minutes into the fire, the stresses in the steel 
reached the reduced yield strength of the material at that 
given time and corresponding temperature of the steel, in-
dicating the onset of plastic behavior. This onset of plastic 
https://doi.org/10.30564/jaeser.v4i3.3327
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behavior occurs earlier in Case 3 than in Case 1. Only half 
the frame is exposed to fire, while the unexposed portion 
of the frame maintains its full yield strength and stiffness. 
The cooler, stronger, adjacent members provide restraint 
against thermal expansion of the heated portion of the 
frame. Additional thermally induced forces then develop 
in the heated members, ultimately increasing the stress in 
the heated members.
Fire Protection Strategies
Common active fire protection strategies include auto-
matic sprinklers and fire/smoke alarms. Common passive 
fire protection strategies include smoke barriers, fire doors 
and windows, fire stops, fire dampers, finishes, furnish-
ings, and materials that prevent or delay the rise of tem-
perature caused by the fire. The increase in temperature 
results primarily from radiation from a nearby fire. Addi-
tional heat transfer may occur from direct flame contact 
of the fire to the structure. Fire protection materials will 
insulate the member and slow the conduction of heat from 
the surface throughout the member, thus reducing the total 
temperature load on the structure. The thickness and na-
ture of the insulated protection material, size of the steel 
member, and weight of the structure must be taken into 
consideration when choosing a fire-resistant material.
Specific fire protection strategies that can be imple-
mented for the steel warehouse that have been identified 
are:
(1) Gypsum board is suggested to be installed at the 
fire-critical locations within the warehouse – Gypsum 
board is a fire protection material that is commonly used 
in buildings due to its ease of insulation and appearance. 
It acts as a physical barrier to prevent the spread of the fire 
for a period of time.
(2) Sprayed fire resistive material (SFRM) that insu-
lates steel from the heat of a fire is recommended for the 
steel members - SFRMs are generally suitable for interior 
use, however more robust SFRM has been developed 
primarily for use in petrochemical plants. Cementitious 
SFRM has low density (15 lb/ft3, 240 kg/m3), medium 
density (20-27 lb/ft3, 320-433 kg/m3), and high density 
(40-80 lb/ft3, 641-1,281 kg/m3) variations. 
(3) Blanket insulation may be installed into the con-
cealed spaces between the roof structure, potentially re-
ducing the hourly rating of the fire. 
Other than the proposed three strategies, concrete 
encasing is also recommended – even though it is the least 
economical material to be used for fire protection purposes. 
Concrete encasing can be used externally and internally. 
Based on the FE analysis outcomes, a proper fire pro-
tection strategy can be designed and implemented for the 
structure in order to meet required fire resistance ratings. 
Fire resistance ratings are calculated based on the length 
of time a structural member or assembly can meet certain 
criteria during fire exposure. ASTM E119 specifies sta-
bility, insulation, and integration criteria for a structure 
exposed to a standard fire.
Application to Energy Storage in Micro-Grid
Current study has also extensive application to the 
mass use of lithium-ion batteries for energy storage appli-
cations. Mega watt (Mw) power supply using lithium-ion 
battery based energy storage solutions have been suggest-
ed to deter power outage problems during severe storms 
for suburban housings – a technology often described as 
micro-gridding.
4. Conclusions
Lithium-ion battery stacks have been suggested as a 
possible implementation for electrified propulsion of all 
modes of transportation. However, studies on lithium ion 
battery fire are limited and design guidelines to prevent 
fire damages due to lithium ion battery fire are almost 
non-existent. The 2017, battery packed train fire in Hou-
ston, TX, served as a cautionary tale for such incident.
This paper reviewed existing fire studies on train fires, 
identified several guidelines that have the potential to ad-
dress the battery fire issue and demonstrated the process 
of fire risk evaluation using a rail repair warehouse as 
a case study. The analyses included a fire risk potential 
analysis using dynamic modeling, a fire risk quantification 
evaluation and a structural fire analysis. Using the fire risk 
analysis, the worst-case scenario is identified as fire reach-
ing the warehouse back entrance (scenario 2) with a criti-
cal fire risk index of 1.5. The results of a 2D finite element 
analysis of potential fire for the steel warehouse indicated 
that the worst fire scenario can result in significant damag-
es within minutes (Case 3 with maximum displacement of 
0.041 m at middle node of roof at 1.2 minutes). 
Based on the fire risk analysis, specific fire protection 
strategies have been identified for the steel warehouse. It 
should be noted that the fire scenarios can be made worse 
as putting out fire from Li-ion batteries are made difficult 
due to sustained fire propagation over extended time peri-
od that may last days.
This paper lays out the critical steps that are needed in 
order to establish the information necessary for the estab-
lishment of a fire protection strategy for infrastructures 
subjected to potential lithium-ion battery fire. The analy-
ses performed are consistent with the fire analysis process 
as recommended by APTA.
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